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Functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI)The aims of this systematic review were to determine: (a) which brain areas are consistently more active
when making (i) moral response decisions, defined as choosing a response to a moral dilemma, or decid-
ing whether to accept a proposed solution, or (ii) moral evaluations, defined as judging the appropriate-
ness of another’s actions in a moral dilemma, rating moral statements as right or wrong, or identifying
important moral issues; and (b) shared and significantly different activation patterns for these two types
of moral judgements. A systematic search of the literature returned 28 experiments. Activation likelihood
estimate analysis identified the brain areas commonly more active for moral response decisions and for
moral evaluations. Conjunction analysis revealed shared activation for both types of moral judgement in
the left middle temporal gyrus, cingulate gyrus, and medial frontal gyrus. Contrast analyses found no sig-
nificant clusters of increased activation for the moral evaluations-moral response decisions contrast, but
found that moral response decisions additionally activated the left and right middle temporal gyrus and
the right precuneus. Making one’s own moral decisions involves different brain areas compared to judg-
ing the moral actions of others, implying that these judgements may involve different processes.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Over the past decade, functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) has increasingly been used to measure the neural correlates
of moral decision-making, adding to our understanding of the cog-
nitive and affective processes involved. Nevertheless, there are
issues with a lack of consistency amongst studies (Christensen &
Gomila, 2012); a variety of different tasks have been used, and
there are no agreed definitions, meaning that moral terms such
as judgement, reasoning, sensitivity and moral cognition are all
used differently across experiments. For the purpose of this study,
we define moral judgements from a developmental psychology
perspective; a moral judgement can refer to any judgement made
within the moral domain, i.e. judgements relating to moral princi-
ples such as harm, justice, and fairness (Smetana, 2006; Turiel,
1983). Moral judgements can either be response decisions about
what to do in a moral dilemma (self), or can be judgements of
others, including judging individuals, groups, institutions or moralprinciples. The distinction between different types of moral judge-
ment has not been explicitly recognised amongst cognitive neuro-
scientists, with recent meta-analyses in this field grouping all task
types together when analysing the neural correlates of moral
decision-making. Task-type may influence the results, and whether
moral judgements related to the self involve different processes,
and different brain areas relative to moral judgements about others
has not yet been considered in previous systematic reviews.
The moral tasks used in fMRI experiments which involve an
active judgement (as opposed to passive judgements) can be
grouped into two categories: (a) moral response decision tasks,
where an individual is asked to make a decision (judgement) about
what they would do in a hypothetical moral dilemma; and (b)
moral evaluation tasks, where an individual is asked to judge the
appropriateness or moral permissibility of another’s actions, or
asked to identify or judge a moral issue or violation. Moral
response decisions require an individual to think about what they
would do in a moral dilemma, whereas moral evaluations require
judging the moral permissibility or appropriateness of the actions
of others in a moral dilemma. Discrepancy has been found for
answers to moral response questions (‘‘Would you do X?”) and
moral evaluation questions (‘‘Is it wrong to do X?)” in moral
B. Garrigan et al. / Brain and Cognition 108 (2016) 88–97 89dilemmas (Tassy, Oullier, Mancini, & Wicker, 2013); ‘‘it seems that
deciding what to do is not processed in the same way as deciding
whether an action is right or wrong, and that in moral dilemmas
it is the first that matters” (Christensen, Flexas, Calabrese, Gut, &
Gomila, 2014, p. 5). A systematic review of moral decision-
making which compares brain activation patterns for moral evalu-
ations and moral response decisions can help to address whether
these different questions are indeed processed in different ways
in the brain. We hypothesised that making one’s own decisions
about what to do in a moral dilemma and judging the moral
actions of others will show increased activation of different brain
areas, with response decisions showing greater activation in self-
referential regions and evaluations showing greater activation in
theory of mind (ToM) regions.
There appears to be no evidence for a uniquely ‘‘moral brain”
(Young & Dungan, 2012), as brain areas that show increased activa-
tion during moral tasks are also involved in other functions. How-
ever, the brain region which appears to be of particular importance
for morality, based on neuroimaging and lesion studies, is the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC Blair, Marsh, Finger, Blair, &
Luo, 2006; Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Marazziti, Baroni, Landi,
Ceresoli, & Dell’Osso, 2013; Raine & Yang, 2006). The vmPFC is
thought to be involved in emotion regulation, and activation dur-
ing moral decision-making tasks is seen as evidence of the involve-
ment of emotion processes in making moral judgements (Greene,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Reviews of moral
neuroimaging evidence have also suggested that ToM is a key cog-
nitive input to moral judgement because ToM brain regions show
increased activation when making moral judgements (Blair et al.,
2006; Young & Dungan, 2012). However, this conclusion may have
been overstated because most neuroimaging experiments utilise
moral evaluation tasks, where participants are asked to evaluate
the actions of others. So while ToM is likely to be involved in judg-
ing the moral permissibility or appropriateness of others’ actions, it
remains to be seen whether ToM brain regions are as active when
making one’s own moral response decisions.
Two recent meta-analyses have been conducted on brain areas
consistently showing increased activation in moral decision-
making studies. Bzdok et al. (2012) performed an activation likeli-
hood estimate (ALE) analysis of morality, empathy and ToM and
found overlap in activation for ToM and morality. Experiments
were only included in the ‘moral cognition’ domain, which they
defined as a ‘‘reflection of the social appropriateness of people’s
actions” (p. 789) if the task required participants to make judge-
ments of other people’s actions. It is, therefore, not surprising that
there was overlap with ToM brain activation, as moral evaluation
tasks require thinking in the third person to evaluate the actions
of others, which may include inferring others’ intentions to judge
the permissibility of their actions. It remains to be investigated
whether such an overlap with ToM regions would occur for moral
response decision tasks. Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) recent system-
atic review of brain processes underlying moral cognition found
activation in the default mode network. They compared brain
activity for active vs. passive judgements and found that active
judgements showed more activity in the temporoparietal junction
(TPJ), angular gyrus, and temporal pole compared to passive view-
ing. Within the active domain however, they did not distinguish
between moral response decision judgements and moral evalua-
tion judgements, so it still remains to be investigated whether
brain activity differs between these two types of moral decisions.
The aims of the current systematic review and meta-analysis
are twofold: (a) to investigate which brain areas consistently show
increased activation when making (i) moral response decisions
(MRD), or (ii) making moral evaluations (ME) compared to non-
moral or neutral decisions or evaluations; and (b) to compare brain
activation patterns for these two types of moral judgements todetermine shared or significant differences in brain activation. A
quality assessment of the included experiments was also under-
taken, something which is often omitted from ALE studies.
All neuroimaging experiments of any type of moral decision-
making were systematically searched and retrieved. Eligible
experiments were categorised as either response decisions, or
evaluations. ALE analysis was used to assess brain areas signifi-
cantly more activated for both types of moral judgement, while
conjunction and contrast analyses were performed to determine
areas of significant difference. This allowed for the potential
discrepancy in brain activation between task-type to be considered.2. Method
2.1. Search strategy
A systematic search was conducted to identify all neuroimaging
experiments of moral decision-making. Three databases, PubMed,
PsycInfo and Web of Science were searched up to March 2015
using the terms ‘‘Moral” AND ‘‘Neuroimag⁄ OR neural OR fMRI
OR functional magnetic resonance OR PET OR positron emission
tomography OR MEG OR magnetoencephalography OR brain”.
Where the database allowed, results were limited to humans, Eng-
lish language and full text articles (excluding letters, editorials
etc.). This search returned 3563 results (2521 after duplicates
removed) which were exported to EndNote X7. A title screen was
performed to remove those obviously irrelevant, followed by an
abstract screen (see Fig. 1 for PRISMA flowchart). One hundred
and twenty-one references remained for full text screening, which
was performed based on the eligibility criteria (Table 1). The refer-
ence list of recent systematic reviews (Bzdok et al., 2012; Sevinc &
Spreng, 2014) were also screened for additional references. The ini-
tial search, title and abstract screen was carried out by BG. Full text
screening was carried out by BG and PL independently and deci-
sions were compared. Where there was a disagreement, these were
discussed with reference to the inclusion criteria and a joint deci-
sion was reached.
Data extraction was performed by BG for the included experi-
ments. Details of task type and description were extracted, along
with relevant foci co-ordinates for the ALE analysis. Experiments
were either categorised as MRDs or MEs based on task design.
Coordinates of moral vs. non-moral/neutral conditions were
extracted into an Excel file and any coordinates reported in Mon-
treal Neurological Institute (MNI) space were converted to Talair-
ach using the icbm2tal transformation in GingerAle 2.3.4 (Laird
et al., 2010; Lancaster et al., 2007). Where an experiment did fit
the inclusions criteria but did not report coordinates of moral vs.
non-moral/neutral conditions, the main author was contacted via
email to request these data. If there was no response after three
weeks, the experiment was excluded due to lack of appropriate
data to extract for ALE analysis. Where an experiment included a
sample of non-typically developing adults, it was only included if
coordinates for the comparison group were presented separately,
and only these data were extracted for analysis. For some experi-
ments, there was more than one moral condition (e.g., moral per-
sonal and moral impersonal) and these were collapsed together
to make moral vs. non-moral for extraction purposes. Where there
was more than one comparison condition to a moral condition,
data were extracted for moral vs. the most neutral condition (i.e.,
if there was a non-moral and a neutral condition, the moral vs.
neutral comparison was extracted). Different experiments had dif-
ferent thresholds for significant clusters, but for each experiment,
coordinates were extracted for moral vs. non-moral or neutral if
they met the whole brain threshold set by the authors. In some
papers, authors reported coordinates under the threshold because
Fig. 1. PRISMA flowchart (from Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, & Altman, 2009).
90 B. Garrigan et al. / Brain and Cognition 108 (2016) 88–97they related to an a priori hypothesis or region of interest; these
coordinates were not extracted for meta-analysis.Table 1
Inclusion and exclusion criteria for experiments.
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
Moral decision-making task with
active judgement required
(response decision or evaluation)
Not moral task, or passive moral task
(e.g. just viewing moral stimuli with
no judgement required)
Neuroimaging method No neuroimaging method used
Talairach or MNI coordinates
reported for whole brain analysis
No coordinates reported, or region of
interest analysis only
Moral task activation compared to
non-moral or neutral task
activation
No control task, or no moral vs. non-
moral/neutral comparison
coordinates reported
Typical/healthy adult subjects. (If
experiment also includes non-
typical participants, data for
comparison group must be
reported separately)
Subjects with developmental or
neurological disorder, psychopathy,
drug dependency or children/
adolescents (can include if
comparison group/adult data
reported separately)
English language paper Not English languageA quality assessment tool was developed by BG and PL, based
on guidelines for reporting an fMRI study (Poldrack et al., 2008),
using a binary scale (1 = evidence reported, 0 = no evidence
reported/unclear/not explicit; see Supplementary Material). Exper-
iments scoring 0–10 were classed as low quality, 11–20 classed as
medium quality and 21–30 classed as high quality. BG performed
quality assessment for all included experiments and PL performed
quality assessment on 20% of included experiments independently.
2.2. Analysis
ALE analysis is a commonly used method for coordinate based
meta-analysis. This method assesses the patterns of activation foci
reported in different experiments, to establish where in the brain
convergence is higher than would be expected if foci were nor-
mally distributed throughout the brain (Eickhoff, Bzdok, Laird,
Kurth, & Fox, 2012; Eickhoff et al., 2009; Turkeltaub et al., 2012),
taking sample sizes of experiments into account. ALE analysis
was performed using GingerAle 2.3.4 on the x, y, z coordinates of
moral vs. non-moral or neutral conditions. Firstly, ALE analysis
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B. Garrigan et al. / Brain and Cognition 108 (2016) 88–97 91was performed for all ME experiments and then for all MRD exper-
iments. A conjunction analysis was then performed to find shared
brain activation for ME and MRD judgements. Contrast analyses
were performed to assess differences in brain activation (MRD-
ME and ME-MRD).
Conjunction analysis comparing the results of the present ALE
to results from recent ALE systematic reviews was not possible
without knowledge of exactly which foci had been extracted for
each included experiment of previous reviews, and was also not
practical due to differences in inclusion and exclusion criteria.
The results of the present ALE were instead compared visually with
results from two recent reviews (Bzdok et al., 2012; Sevinc &
Spreng, 2014) where appropriate, and outlined in the discussion.
Results from these previous reviews were reported in MNI coordi-
nates, so for an easier comparison with our results we transformed
their reported coordinates to Talairach coordinates using the using
the icbm2tal transformation in GingerAle 2.3.4 (Laird et al., 2010;
Lancaster et al., 2007) and then labelled the areas using Talairach
client (Lancaster et al., 1997, 2000).xp
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After full text screening, 28 separate experiments were eligible
for inclusion, with a total of 271 foci from 642 participants. All
experiments used fMRI, 10 used a MRD task and 18 used a ME task.
Table 2 shows the main characteristics of the included
experiments.
ALE analysis was performed for all ME experiments and all MRD
experiments, cluster-level = 0.05, 1000 permutations, p = 0.001. Con-
junction and contrast analyses were then performed, p = 0.01, 1000
permutations, minimum cluster = 200mm3, to assess shared and
divergent brain activation between the two task types. Table 3
shows the results of ALE analysis, and Fig. 2 shows the largest sig-
nificant clusters of brain activation found for each ALE analysis. All
coordinates are reported in Talairach space.
Six significant clusters of activation were found across the ME
experiments (18 experiments, 174 foci, 383 participants): two in
the left medial frontal gyrus (MFG), the left superior temporal
gyrus (STG), left cingulate gyrus (CG), right STG and right MFG.
Six significant clusters were found across the MRD experiments
(10 experiments, 97 foci, 259 participants): left middle temporal
gyrus (MTG), left precuneus, right MFG, right MTG, right inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) and left caudate. Conjunction analysis revealed
three clusters of shared activation for both moral task types: the
left MTG, left cingulate gyrus and left MFG. A contrast analysis of
MEs-MRDs did not find any significant clusters. However, a con-
trast analysis of MRDs-MEs found three significant clusters: the
right MTG, right precuneus, and left MTG.
Quality assessment indicated that 20 experiments were high
quality, eight were medium quality and none were low quality
(see Supplementary Material). The medium quality experiments
did not report as much information as the high quality experi-
ments. Analyses included all experiments regardless of quality,
but issues regarding the quality of included experiments are out-
lined in the discussion and should be taken into consideration
when interpreting the results. Agreement between BG and PL for
quality assessment was k = 1 (p = 0.14), ICC = 0.88 (p = 0.005).Ta
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204. Discussion
4.1. Interpretation of significant clusters of activation
This systematic review and meta-analysis builds on previous
reviews in the field by differentiating between MRD judgements
and ME judgements, to assess similarities and differences in
Table 2 (continued)
Reference Subjects Conditions No.
foci
Moral stimuli Moral task instructions/response format
Moral evaluations
Avram et al. (2013) 16 Moral vs. esthetic 8 Written moral statements Decide whether each moral statement could be considered
‘right’ by pressing button
Avram et al. (2014) 16 Moral (1st and 3rd person)
vs. non-moral
10 Written moral statements Rate each statement as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ using button press
Bahnemann et al. (2010) 25 Moral vs. physical 10 Animated stimuli of two people in a social interaction.
Protagonist’s behaviour was either in accordance with or in
violation of a social norm
Yes/no button press to ‘‘Is the protagonist violating a norm?”
after each moral dilemma
de Achával et al. (2013) 13 Moral vs. non-moral 6 Modified version of Moral Dilemmas Test (Greene et al.,
2001) presented as text
Yes/ no button press to ‘‘Would you consider it appropriate
to. . .?” after each dilemma
Harada et al. (2009) 18 Moral vs. gender judgement 9 Written stories of protagonist performing good or bad deed Yes/no button press to ‘‘Is the protagonist’s behaviour
morally bad?”
Harenski, Antonenko, Shane, and Kiehl
(2008)
28 Moral vs. non-moral 15 Moral pictures from IAPS and media, depicting unpleasant
social scenes indicating a moral violation
Determine if the picture represented a moral violation and
rate the severity of the violation on scale of 1–5 using button
press to stop rating bar
Harenski et al. (2012) 36 Moral vs. neutral 7 Moral pictures from IAPS and media, depicting unpleasant
social scenes indicating a moral violation
Rate moral violation severity of picture on scale of 1–5 using
button press to stop rating bar
Harenski et al. (2014) 46 Moral vs. neutral 23 Moral pictures from IAPS and media, depicting unpleasant
social scenes indicating a moral violation
Rate severity of moral transgression in pictures from 1 to 5
using button press to stop rating bar
Heekeren, Wartenburger, Schmidt,
Schwintowski, and Villringer (2003)
8 Moral vs. semantic 9 Written sentences (German) Judge whether actions described in sentences were
‘‘appropriate” or ‘‘inappropriate” with button press
Heekeren et al. (2005) 12 Moral vs. semantic 8 Written sentences (German)containing bodily harm or not Judge if actions described in moral sentences were
‘‘appropriate” or ‘‘inappropriate” with button press
Moll et al. (2001) 10 Moral vs. factual 10 Moral sentences presented aurally Think about each statement and judge whether they are
’right’ or ’wrong’. No overt judgement in scanner
Moll et al. (2002) 7 Moral vs. non-moral neutral 2 Written moral statements Covertly judge each sentence as ’right’ or ’wrong’. No overt
judgement in scanner
Parkinson et al. (2011) 30 Moral (harmful, dishonest
and disgust) vs. neutral
30 Written moral scenarios Decide if main character’s actions were ’wrong’ or ’not wrong’
with button press
Prehn et al. (2008) 23 Socio-normative vs.
grammatical
6 Written sentences Decide if action described was a social norm violation or not
with yes/no button press
Reniers et al. (2012) 24 Moral vs. non-moral 6 Written scenarios of moral decision-making Yes/no to ‘‘Is it ok for X to do this?” using button press
Robertson et al. (2007) 16 Moral (care/justice) vs.
neutral nonmoral
5 Written business case scenario describing workday of a
fictional marketing research analyst
Press button when identify an important point or issue
Schleim, Spranger, Erk, and Walter (2011) 40 Moral vs. personal 6 Written stories adapted from moral issues in media Had to judge if behaviour in stories was right from a moral
point of view. Decide between ’yes, rightly’ and ’no, not
rightly’ using button press
Takahashi et al. (2008) 15 Moral (beauty and
depravity) vs. neutral
4 Written sentences (Japanese) Read sentences silently and rate according to how moral/
immoral or praiseworthy/blameworthy the events were (no
overt judgement in scanner)
Number of subjects is the number included in the analysis that was extracted for this review (e.g., number of subjects in control group sample) not necessarily the total number of subjects in the experiment. Harenski et al. (2014)
coordinates for control group were sent by main author after email request.
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Table 3
Significant clusters of activation for moral evaluations, moral response decisions, and conjunction and convergence analysis.
# Volume (mm3) X y z Cerebrum Label Brodmann area
Moral evaluations 1 3296 6 44 20 Left MFG 9
2 2176 44 56 18 Left STG 39
3 2024 2 56 26 Left CG 31
4 744 50 6 20 Right STG 38
5 384 2 54 2 Right MFG 10
6 296 4 48 6 Left MFG 10
Moral response decisions 1 1968 44 64 20 Left MTG 39
2 1928 2 60 30 Left Precuneus 7
3 1512 2 44 36 Right MFG 6
4 1248 44 60 24 Right MTG 39
5 296 36 28 12 Right IFG 47
6 264 12 4 12 Left Caudate –
Conjunction of moral evaluations and
moral response decisions
1 712 44 60 18 Left MTG 19
2 680 2 56 28 Left CG 31
3 312 6 44 40 Left MFG 8
Moral response decisions-moral
evaluations
1 904 42.8 56 21 Right MTG 39
2 408 3 64 30 Right Precuneus 31
3 264 40 66 16 Left MTG 39
X, y, z coordinates are reported in Talairach space and refer to the maximum value of each cluster. Moral evaluation and moral response decision ALE analyses performed
using cluster-level = 0.05, 1000 permutations, p = 0.001. Conjunction and contrast analysis performed using p = 0.01, 1000 permutations, minimum volume = 200 mm3.
Labels and Brodmann areas generated by GingerAle 2.3.4. MFG = medial frontal gyrus, STG = superior temporal gyrus, CG = Cingulate gyrus, MTG = middle temporal gyrus,
IFG = inferior frontal gyrus.
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sions. The ALE analyses found three significant clusters of shared
brain activation for both task types: the left MTG, CG and MFG.
Contrast analysis revealed that MRDs additionally activated the
right MTG, right precuneus and left MTG. These findings show that
making one’s own moral judgements about what to do in a moral
dilemma is associated with increased activation of differing brain
areas, as we predicted.
The brain region which has been most commonly implicated in
moral decision-making, based on neuroimaging and lesion studies
is the vmPFC. This region is not precisely defined in the literature
but usually refers to any brain areas in the ventromedial frontal
lobe, and BA’s 10, 11, 24, 25 and 32 (Nieuwenhuis & Takashima,
2011). We only found a significant cluster of activation of this
region for MEs (cluster 5 and 6, MFG BA 10) and also the adjacent
BA 9 (cluster 1, MFG), rather than MRDs, and this region did not
remain significant in the conjunction analysis, probably because
it was the smallest of the clusters found for MEs. The lack of a sig-
nificant cluster of activation in the vmPFC for MRDs highlights that
most previous conclusions about brain activation for moral
decision-making have been made based on ME tasks; further
research on the involvement of this region for MRDs is needed,
as the current review only identified 10 relevant MRD
experiments.
The three clusters of significant shared activation for both moral
task type (ME and MRD) - the left MTG, left CG, and left MFG - are
also involved in other processes, so are not unique or specific to
making moral judgements. Such a view that there is no ‘moral
brain’ suggests that many processes such as attention, working
memory, emotion recognition, empathic arousal and retrieval of
relevant schemas may be involved when making moral judge-
ments, thus many brain areas related to various domains are likely
to be recruited. All three significant clusters were found in the left
hemisphere, which is involved in language (Springer et al., 1999)
so this may reflect the fact that most of the tasks involve language
processing. It has been found that perceptual decisions engaged
the left hemisphere of the MFG (Talati & Hirsch, 2005) and that
the MTG is involved in multimodal semantic processing (Visser,
Jefferies, Embleton, & Ralph, 2012) with the left MTG being the
core component of the semantic network (Wei et al., 2012). The
cluster of activation in the cingulate gyrus was found in BA 31,which is part of the posterior cingulate cortex and has been found
to show an increase in activation when judging the valence of emo-
tional words (Maddock, Garrett, & Buonocore, 2003); increased
activation of this area for both types of moral task may reflect pro-
cessing of written emotional stimuli.
Relative to ME tasks, MRDs were found to additionally activate
the left and right MTG and the right precuneus. These findings sup-
port our hypothesis that MRDs will show increased activation of
more self-referential brain areas. The precuneus, a brain region
more highly developed in humans than other animals, is involved
in higher order cognitive processes including self-processing and
consciousness (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006) and egocentric spatial
processing (Freton et al., 2014). The MTG also showed an increase
in activation for MRDs but not MEs, suggesting it may play a role in
making one’s own decisions, particularly the right MTG which was
not a significant cluster in the conjunction analysis. While activa-
tion of the right precuneus in MRD tasks may reflect increased
self-referential processing compared to when making MEs of
other’s behaviour, it may just reflect differences between the moral
task types. The right precuneus is associated with metaphor com-
prehension (Mashal, Vishne, & Laor, 2014) and verbal creative
thinking (Chen et al., 2015), so activation of this region during
MRD tasks may reflect the fact that these tasks tend to involve
dilemmas that are not real life (e.g., choosing to kill one or five peo-
ple), thus may require more abstract thinking about unfamiliar
situations.
We hypothesised that the ME tasks would show increased acti-
vation of more ToM related areas than MRD tasks, as they involve
thinking about the mental states of others to judge moral beha-
viour. This hypothesis was not supported, as the contrast analysis
for MEs-MRDs did not reveal any significant clusters. The right
temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) has been suggested as an area
important for ToM (Saxe & Powell, 2006). The rTPJ is a vaguely
defined area but is also referred to as Brodmann Area (BA) 39
(Bzdok et al., 2013). Contrary to our hypothesis, the ALE analysis
revealed that the rTPJ (BA 39, MTG) showed significantly increased
activation across the MRD tasks (cluster 4) but not across the ME
tasks. The surprising finding of significant activation of this area
for MRDs but not MEs suggests that ToM processes are even more
involved when making one’s own moral decisions than when mak-
ing evaluations of others. One explanation may be that when
Moral evaluation clusters
Moral response decision clusters
Conjunction analysis: Shared activation for moral evaluation and moral response decisions
Contrast analysis: Moral response decisions-moral evaluations
Fig. 2. Brain activation maps showing significant clusters of activation. Images created in GingerAle 2.3.4, overlaid onto Colin 2  2  2 template in Mango (Lancaster &
Martinez 2006–2015). Brain images are axial, sagittal and coronal view of main clusters of activation for each ALE analysis. Image labels: L = left, R = right, P = posterior,
A = anterior, S = superior.
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about the consequences of their possible actions for others, e.g.
‘‘would my actions upset/harm someone?” ToM abilities develop
with age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) and the perspectives
of others are taken into account more as egocentric bias decreases
(Gibbs, 2013), and this may reflect the increased activation of the
rTPJ for MRDs amongst adults found in this meta-analysis.
Harenski, Harenski, Shane, and Kiehl’s (2012) ME study which weincluded in our meta-analysis also included an adolescent sample,
and they found that involvement of the rTPJ while viewing moral
pictures increased with age. Developmental fMRI studies of MRDs
are needed, to establish whether the involvement of ToM regions
when making one’s own moral decisions increases with age. The
hypothetical dilemmas used in the included MRD experiments
involved other people, so participants may typically infer the men-
tal states or possible mental states of others when deciding their
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other people, such as judging sentences as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ so
would not have led to participants inferring mental states of
others. Contrary to our finding, Bzdok et al. (2012) found signifi-
cant activation in the rTPJ for their moral cognition domain. How-
ever, experiments were only included in their moral cognition
analysis if they involved participants making ‘‘appropriateness
judgements on actions of one individual towards others” (p. 785)
so always involved other people. The lack of rTPJ involvement for
MEs in this meta-analysis may reflect the type of evaluation tasks
used. Our finding suggested that not all types of moral decision-
making involve ToM processes - it depends on whether the
dilemma or stimuli involves other people, which can lead individ-
uals to infer the mental states of others when considering the pos-
sible consequences of their decisions. Real life moral dilemmas are
likely to involve other people, so ToM processes are likely to be
involved in such decisions, and involvement may change with age.
We compared our findings to those of two recent systematic
reviews of moral decision-making, Bzdok et al. (2012) and Sevinc
and Spreng (2014). As previously stated, the criteria for Bzdok
et al.’s (2012) moral cognition domain was that participants were
required to make appropriateness judgements, which is what we
have termed moral evaluations. We, therefore, compared our ALE
analysis results for MEs to Bzdok et al.’s (2012) results for the
moral cognition domain. Our results are fairly comparable to
Bzdok et al.’s (2012) with both finding activation in the left and
right MFG (BA 10, labelled by Bzdok et al. as vmPFC) and the right
STG (BA 38, labelled by Bzdok et al. as the right temporal pole). In
line with Bzdok et al.’s (2012) analysis, we also found a cluster of
activation in the left STG (labelled by Bzdok et al. as left TPJ),
though in our analysis this was BA 39 and from their analysis it
was BA 22, although these are adjacent areas. As previously stated,
Bzdok et al. (2012) found a cluster of activation in the rTPJ (BA 39),
which we did not find. Another discrepancy between our ME acti-
vation clusters and Bzdok et al.’s (2012) for moral cognition are
that they found a cluster of activation in the left amygdala, which
we did not find. Also, Bzdok et al. (2012) reported activation in the
precuneus, which was not found to be a cluster of significant acti-
vation for the ME experiments in our analysis, although our results
did reveal activation in the adjacent cingulate gyrus. Differences
between our findings and Bzdok et al.’s (2012) may be partly due
to discrepancies between Talairach labels and the SPM anatomy
toolbox, and also due to the differences of tasks for the included
experiments; Bzdok et al. (2012) included only experiments where
participants were required to make appropriateness judgements
on the actions of one individual towards others while we included
any ME judgement, including tasks where participants had to
judge moral sentences. Our ALE analysis results for MRDs are not
comparable with Bzdok et al.’s (2012) moral cognition results, sup-
porting the finding that judging the appropriateness of others
actions increases activation of different brain regions compared
to when making one’s own moral response decisions.
Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) systematic review compared brain
activation for active and passive moral tasks. As our review only
included tasks that required an active decision, we compared our
findings for MRDs and MEs to Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) findings
for active tasks. Our ALE results for MEs are fairly comparable to
Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) ALE results for active tasks, with both
finding clusters of activation in the left MFG (BA 9, labelled by
Sevinc & Spreng as medial PFC and anterior superior frontal sul-
cus), right MFG (BA 10, labelled by Sevinc & Spreng as vmPFC
and superior temporal sulcus), right STG (BA 38, labelled by Sevinc
& Spreng as MTG) and the left cingulate gyrus (BA 31, labelled by
Sevinc & Spreng as posterior cingulate cortex). Comparing our
results for MRDs to Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014) active results, there
is no direct overlap but there are some similarities. Sevinc andSpreng (2014) found a cluster of activation in the left MTG, BA
22, whereas our ALE analysis for MRDs revealed a cluster in the left
MTG BA 39, adjacent to BA 22. Sevinc and Spreng (2014) found
activation in the left IFG whereas we found activation in the right
IFG for MRDs. Again, differences may be due to discrepancies
between Talairach and MNI labelling and also differences between
tasks of the included experiments. For Sevinc and Spreng’s (2014)
active domain, four of the included experiments were also included
in our MRD domain, but we included an additional six MRD exper-
iments, and the majority of the active experiments in Sevinc and
Spreng (2014) were MEs.
4.2. Quality assessment and critique of tasks used in included
experiments
As far as we are aware, this review is the first ALE meta-analysis
to report on the quality of included experiments. In the absence of
a pre-existing standardised quality assessment tool for an ALE sys-
tematic review, the quality assessment tool was adapted from
guidelines for reporting fMRI studies (Poldrack et al., 2008). Future
reviews could use this checklist, or similar quality assessment
tools, and should exclude low quality experiments from ALE anal-
ysis. While the majority of included experiments in this systematic
review were found to be of high quality, based on the adapted
checklist, there were issues with some of the tasks used.
Firstly, there was a wide range of moral tasks used across the
included experiments, and it is important to acknowledge that dif-
ferences in brain activation may reflect differences in the tasks
used across studies, in terms of modality and content of the moral
stimuli, and the nature of the control task. The presentation modal-
ity varied, and while most tasks used written stimuli presented on
screens for participants to read, some experiments, such as
Bahnemann, Dziobek, Prehn, Wolf, and Heekeren (2010) used ani-
mated stimuli, with participants being asked to judge if the protag-
onist in the animations is violating a norm. Also, there were
differences in the context and amount of detail of moral stimuli
across moral tasks. Bahnemann et al.’s (2010) animations featured
a social violation where a protagonist is punching the other person
in the face. While this is a real life social and moral (harm) viola-
tion, it could be argued that this scenario would be more emotive
if the victim was murdered. Differences in emotional engagement,
paying more attention to out of the ordinary stimuli, or having to
think more about scenarios not previously encountered (such as
many of the life and death choices presented in moral tasks) are
likely to contribute to differences across experiments.
One limitation of some of the included experiments is the nat-
ure of the task that was used as a comparison to the moral task. For
some experiments, participants were asked to respond similarly
across control and experimental conditions, while the stimuli var-
ied. For example, in Parkinson et al. (2011), participants judged
whether a character’s actions were right or wrong within neutral
or moral tasks. Differences in brain activity may therefore have
been partially accounted for by differences in reading and process-
ing moral, compared to neutral scenarios, rather than for making a
moral compared to a neutral evaluation judgement, which the
authors did acknowledge (p. 3166). Similar issues exist across sev-
eral other experiments (Harenski et al., 2012; Harenski, Edwards,
Harenski, & Kiehl, 2014; Han, Glover, & Jeong, 2014; Moll,
Eslinger, & de Oliveira-Souza, 2001; Moll et al., 2002; Reniers
et al., 2012). Several of the included experiments used the same
moral task, classified as a MRD task, where participants were asked
‘‘would you do X?” after reading a scenario about Mr. Jones’
dilemma (Harrison et al., 2012; Pujol et al., 2008; Verdejo-Garcia
et al., 2014). For the control condition, participants were asked to
recall the correct answer to the non-dilemma vignette, which they
had been familiarised with before the scanner task, e.g., ‘‘will he go
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therefore, a recall rather than a decision task, thus the results show
brain activation differences for recall vs. a MRD judgement, rather
than brain activation for making a moral as opposed to a non-
moral decision. For some of the included experiments, the control
task may not have been an appropriate comparison for moral tasks
(i.e., not a non-moral or neutral judgement task), so we should be
cautious about the significant moral decision-making peak coordi-
nates from these experiments.
4.3. Limitations
There are several limitations to this review and meta-analysis.
Firstly, only 10 MRD experiments were identified from the litera-
ture, and 15 is the minimum recommended number of experi-
ments for ALE contrast analysis (Laird et al., 2010; Lancaster
et al., 2007). While significant clusters were still found for MRD
and ME judgements, and the findings are novel, the results should
be interpreted with caution as the MRD clusters are only based on
10 experiments. Secondly, there were some experiments where it
was ambiguous as to whether the task was a MRD or ME task.
We categorised the experiments based on the authors’ claims,
and the type of question participants responded to (evaluation or
response decision), but difficulty categorising some of the experi-
ments highlights the lack of consistency amongst moral tasks used
in fMRI experiments. Thirdly, some of the tasks appeared to lack
ecological validity as they did not seem to reflect how moral deci-
sions are made in real life situations. We recommend that future
neuroimaging experiments use more real life scenarios for assess-
ing moral decision-making, for example, everyday scenarios that
people are more likely to encounter than life or death situations.
Finally, to ensure comparability across studies, adolescents were
excluded. The conclusions drawn, therefore, only apply to adults.
Further neuroimaging studies focusing on children and adolescents
would help answer questions about moral development and the
developmental pattern of the neural correlates of moral decisions.
5. Conclusion
This is the first systematic review of moral decision-making to
explicitly acknowledge the different types of moral decisions, and
to compare brain activity for the two main types, MRDs and MEs.
Findings from the ALE analysis show that making one’s own moral
judgements about what to do in a moral dilemma involves
increased activation of additional brain areas compared to judging
the moral actions of others, suggesting different processes may be
involved. Making one’s own decisions appears to involve an
extended brain network, incorporating self-referential regions
which do not show an increase in activation when making moral
evaluations of others. Most previous conclusions about moral
decision-making have been based on moral evaluation tasks; fur-
ther neuroimaging studies employing moral response decisions
tasks of real life scenarios are needed before we can be confident
about which brain areas are needed for making one’s own, every
day moral response decisions.
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